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Agent Cognitive Capabilities and Orders of Social 
Emergence. 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter critically examines our theoretical understanding of the dialectical relationship 
between emergent social structures and agent behaviors. While much has been written about 
emergence individually as a concept and the use of simulation methods are being increasingly 
applied to the exploration of social behavior, the concept of ‘social emergence’ remains ill 
defined. Furthermore there has been little theoretical treatment or practical exploration of how 
both the range and type of emergent structures observed may change as agents are endowed 
with increasingly sophisticated cognitive abilities. While we are still a very long way from 
being able to build artificial agents with human-like cognitive capabilities it would be timely 
to revisit the extent of the challenge and to see where recent advances in our understanding of 
higher order cognition leave us. This chapter provides a brief recount of the theory of 
emergence, considers recent contributions to thinking about orders of emergence, and 
unpacks these in terms of implied agent characteristics. Observations are made about the 
implications of alternative cognitive paradigms and the position is proposed that an enactivist 
view provides the most logical pathway to advancing our understanding. The chapter 
concludes by presenting an account of reflexive and non-reflexive modes of emergence which 
incorporates this view.   
INTRODUCTION 
Building and working with artificial societies using the methods of multi-agent social 
simulation serves us in several ways: 1) It allows us to operationalize social theories and to 
compare simulated behaviors with those observed in the real world; and 2) it allows us to 
build new theory by exploring the minimal mechanisms that might explain observed social 
behavior. Most importantly 3) it provides a unique ability to explore the interplay between 
levels of phenomena and to understand dynamic properties of systems. A great deal can and 
has been achieved in both these areas with even the simple methods we currently have 
available. However, Keith Sawyer (2003) has recently reminded us that, to date, we have 
worked with agents with very limited cognitive capability and that this necessarily limits the 
range and type of behavior which can be explored. This echoes a sentiment made a decade 
ago by Christiano Castelfranchi (1998a) that social simulation is not really social until it can 
provide an adequate account of the implication of feedback between macro and micro which 
becomes possible with higher cognitive functioning of social agents.   
In many respects, developments in our capacity to simulate artificial societies have led us to 
confront anew a long-standing issue within social theory. This is a problem that social science 
conducted within traditional disciplinary boundaries has become quite adept at avoiding. 
Indeed it can be argued that the particular form disciplinary fragmentation takes in social 
science is a primary strategy for avoiding it. The problem is referred to in a number of ways 
depending on the disciplinary tradition.  This chapter begins by revisiting this most important 
of problems. In terms of the challenge it poses to artificial societies it can be expressed in the 
following three questions.  
1. What are the fundamental cognitive characteristics which distinguish human agents 
from animal or automaton?  
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2. How do these characteristics influence the range and type of behaviors agents may 
generate and the emergent structures which they may give rise to?  
3. How can we theorize about the relationship between cognitive capability and 
categories of emergent form? 
These questions form the focus for this chapter. We begin to address them by revisiting the 
contribution of alternative schools of thought to our understanding of the nature and origins of 
emergent structure and alternative concepts of orders of emergence. We then discuss the 
implications of the two competing cognitive paradigms within AI – that of cognitivism and 
the enactive view. Finally we turn to current research on the development of human cognition 
and examine its implications for anticipating different orders of emergent structure – 
proposing what we call reflexive and non-reflexive classes of emergence. Finally a research 
program for the advancement of understanding in this area is proposed.  
This work has its origins in two strands of research with which the authors are currently 
involved. The first addresses the relationship between micro and macro levels of social 
behavior and organization directly. Over the past decade we have explored the characteristics 
of the micro-macro problem (see Chris Goldspink & Kay, 2003, 2004) in pursuit of a 
coherent and consistent account of the interpenetration (circular causality) between micro and 
macro phenomena. Our aim is to develop a theory which can provide a substantive account of 
fundamental social generative mechanisms. To date no such social theory exists that 
satisfactorily explains this dynamic.  
The other strand is one author’s involvement with the Centre for Research in Social 
Simulation and though it the European Union funded project titled Emergence in the Loop 
(EMIL). The aim of EMIL is to :  a) provide a theoretical account of the mechanisms of 
normative self-regulation in a number of computer mediated communities b) specify the 
minimum cognitive processes agents require to behave in normative ways c) develop a 
simulator which can replicate the range and type of normative behavior identified by the 
empirical research so as to further deepen our understanding of how and under what 
conditions normative self-regulation is possible and the range and type of environmental 
factors which influence it.  
A BRIEF RECOUNT OF THE THEORY OF EMERGENCE  
The notion of emergence has a long history, having been invoked in a number of disciplines 
with varying degrees of centrality to the theoretical and methodological development of 
associated fields.  Unfortunately the concept has largely remained opaque and ambiguous in 
its conceptualization, leading to the criticism that it stands as little more than a covering 
concept – used when no adequate account or explanation exists for some unexpected 
phenomena. Clayton has argued that the concept covers:  
…a wide spectrum of ontological commitments. According to some the emergents are no 
more than patterns, with no causal powers of their own; for others they are substances in 
their own right… (Clayton, 2006: 14).  
The origin of the concept has been attributed to George Henry Lewes who coined the term in 
1875 (Ablowitz, 1939). It subsequently found wide adoption within the philosophy of science 
but more recently has been advanced within three distinct streams: philosophy, particularly of 
science and mind; systems theory, in particular complex systems; and social science where it 
has largely been referred to under the heading of the micro-macro link and/or the problem of 
structure and agency. Interestingly there has been relatively little cross fertilization of 
thinking between these streams.  
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The Contribution from Philosophy of science 
The philosophy of science and philosophy of mind stream is arguably the oldest – some date 
it back to Plato (Peterson, 2006) but the debate is widely seen as having come to focus with 
the British Emergentists (Eronen, 2004; Shrader, 2005; Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, 2006). This school sought to deal with the apparent qualitatively distinct 
properties associated with different phenomena (physical, chemical, biological, mental) in the 
context of the debate between mechanism and vitalism: the former being committed to 
Laplacian causal determinism and hence reductionism and the latter invoking ‘non-physical’ 
elements in order to explain the qualitative difference between organic and in-organic matter. 
This stream remains focused on explaining different properties of classes of natural 
phenomena and with the relationship between brains and minds (See Clayton & Davies, 2006 
for a recent summary of the positions). As a consequence this has been the dominant stream 
within artificial intelligence. Peterson (2006: 695) summarizes the widely agreed 
characteristics of emergent phenomena within this stream as follows.  Emergent entities: 
1. Are characterized by higher-order descriptions (i.e. form a hierarchy). 
2. Obey higher order laws. 
3. Are characterized by unpredictable novelty. 
4. Are composed of lower level entities, but lower level entities are insufficient to fully 
account for emergent entities (irreducibility). 
5. May be capable of top-down causation. 
6. Are characterized by multiple realization or wild disjunction (Fodor, 1974) (alternative 
micro-states may generate the same macro states).  
A key concept within these discussions is that of supervenience: a specification of the ‘loose’ 
determinisms held to apply between levels such that „…an entity cannot change at a higher 
level without also changing at a lower level‟  (Sawyer, 2001: 556). Within this stream 
prominence of place is given to both downward and upward causation. Clayton and Davies 
(2006) specify downward causation as involving macro structures placing constraint on lower 
level processes hence „Emergent entities provide the context in which local, bottom up 
causation takes place and is made possible‟ (Peterson, 2006: 697). Davies (2006) argues that 
the mechanism of downward causation can usefully be considered in terms of boundaries. 
Novelty, he argues, may have its origin in a system being ‘open’. If novel order emerges it 
must do so within the constraints of physics. He concludes: 
…top-down talk refers not to vitalistic augmentation of known forces, but rather to the 
system harnessing existing forces for its own ends. The problem is to understand how this 
harnessing happens, not at the level of individual intermolecular interactions, but overall 
– as a coherent project. It appears that once a system is sufficiently complex, then new top 
down rules of causation emerge. (Davies 2006: 48).  
For Davies then, top-down causation is associated with self-organization and may undergo 
qualitative transitions in form with increasing system complexity. For Davies also it is the 
‘openness’ of some systems that ‘provides room’ for self-organizing process to arise, but he 
concludes, „openness to the environment merely explains why there may be room for top-
down causation; it tells us nothing about how that causation works.‟ The devil then, is in the 
detail of the mechanisms specific to particular processes in particular contexts and particular 
phenomenal domains. Perhaps then a part of the problem with the concept is that it has been 
approached at too abstract a level.  
The contribution from Social Science 
The micro-macro problem – the relationship between the actions of individuals and resulting 
social structures and the reciprocal constraint those structures place on individual agency – 
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has long standing in social science as well as in philosophy. The problem is central to many 
social theories developed throughout the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century. Examples include: Marxian 
dialectical materialism (Engels, 1934) built upon by, among others, Vygotsky (1962) and 
Lyont’ev (1978);  the social constructionism of  Berger and Luckmann (1972); Gidden’s 
structuration theory (1984); and the recent work of critical realists (Archer, 1998; Archer, 
Bhaskar, Ciollier, Lawson, & Norrie, 1998; Bhaskar, 1997, 1998). These alternative theories 
are frequently founded on differing assumptions, extending from the essentially 
objectivist/rationalist theory of Coleman (1994), through the critical theories of Habermas and 
to the radical constructivism of Luhmann (1990; 1995).  
Fuchs & Hofkirchner (2005: 33) have recently suggested a four category schema for 
classifying social theory according to the ontological position adopted with respect to the 
micro-macro relationship. The majority of existing social theories, they argue, fall into one or 
other of two categories which they label individualism and sociologism. Neither of these 
‘paradigms’ provides a theoretical foundation which supports exploration let alone the 
possibility of advancing understanding of the interplay between agency and structure, rather 
the problem is avoided by restricting analysis to one level or the other. A third category, 
dualism, while considering both aspects, insists on the adoption of a dichotomous stance and 
as a consequence does not support any understanding of the interplay between levels. Only 
those theories categorized as dialectical therefore have relevance. Even here, it is reasonable 
to conclude that little practical advance has been achieved, as most positions result in a 
straddling of bottom up and top-down arguments and/or suffer from excessively vague 
conceptualization. These theories also quickly break down into a dichotomy the moment an 
attempt is made to make them operational.  
What has been largely agreed, despite the very different theoretical and often inadequate 
handling of this problem, is that structure and agency come together in activity or in body-
hood – the specific psycho-motor state at the instant of enaction. Both Vygotsky and Giddens, 
for example, focus on action as the point of intersection between human agency and social 
structures and it is implicit in Bourdieu’s habitus also.  
The contribution from Systems Theory 
Systems language was clearly evident in the work of the early Emergentists and in a great 
deal of sociology and anthropology which took seriously the structure/agency problem – 
notably that of Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson. However, ‘systems’ as a focus of 
systematic research arguably took form with von Bertalanffy’s attempt to establish a General 
Systems Theory in 1950 (Bertalanffy, 1950; Bertalanffy_von, 1968). As the science of 
‘wholes’ systems theory stands in contrast to reductionisms concern with parts. Systems 
theory was put forward as a counter to what was perceived as excessive reductionism 
dominating scientific discourse during much of the 20
th
 century. 
In the early stages of development of the theory systems tended to be modeled as ‘black 
boxes’ effectively masking the relationship between micro and macro elements. The 
application of the concept to social science, in particular through the development by Ernst 
von Glasersfeld and Heinz von Foerster (Keeney, 1987) of social cybernetics along with soft 
systems approaches (Checkland, 1988) provided a theoretical lens and methods useful for 
describing the systemic behavior of social systems. So while the aspiration of GSM to 
establish a general science of systems is generally regarded to have failed (Jackson, 2000), 
systems approaches have contributed valuable methods for the study of the interplay between 
levels in a social system. The Systems view of emergence was founded on: 
 Holism; the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
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 A concern with feedback both positive and negative.  
 A concern with boundaries and boundary conditions.  
More recently the development of complex systems theory and its application to natural, 
social and cognitive phenomena has provided additional concepts upon which much current 
debate about emergence draws. Many of these concepts and methods have become widely 
used within the multi-agent modeling community (Castelfranchi, 1998b; Conte, Hegselmann, 
& Terna, 1997; Gilbert, 1995; Holland, 1998).  
Within contemporary debate, and in contrast to the position taken by the British Emergentists 
who argued that irreducibility was the exception (Eronen, 2004), most real world systems are 
now argued to be non-linear (S. Kauffman, 2000; S. A. Kauffman, 1993, 1996; Stewart, 1990) 
and hence irreducible. It is non-linearity which contributes to these system’s capacity for 
novelty and unpredictability through the presence of deterministic Chaos (Lorenz, 2001; 
Williams, 1997) and/or equifinality. Equifinality as it is known within systems theory, or the 
principle of ‘wild disjunction’ as it is known in philosophy, refers to a system where a single 
high level property may be realized by more than one set of micro-states which have no 
lawful relationship between them (Richardson, 2002a, 2002b; Sawyer, 2001). As there is no 
a-priori basis by which the likely micro state can be determined, such systems are irreducible 
and unpredictable in principle.  
Observations 
The concept of emergence has led to the establishment of a number of general principles 
which describe the relationship between micro and macro phenomena, as well as some 
methods and techniques for identifying and exploring it. Specifically, we can conclude that 
there are systems which are: 
 inherently analytically reducible (to which the concept of emergence does not apply); 
 analytically reducible in principle but difficult to reduce in practice and/or where an 
advance in science/knowledge is needed for reduction to be possible because the results 
were ‘unexpected’ (Chalmers, 2006) (to which the concept of ‘weak’ emergence can be 
applied); 
 not reducible in principle (to which the principle of ‘strong’ emergence is relevant). 
We argue that all living systems and all social systems belong to the latter class. Accordingly 
we agree with McKelvey (1997) that a great deal of social order may be attributable to 
complex organization involving non-liner relations between elements. It is for this reason that 
simulation methods are regarded as important but only to the extent that we can construct 
artificial societies which are reasonable analogues of the social systems we want to 
understand and this implies agent architectures which are capable of generating the range of 
social behaviors/structures of interest. The problem here is that we still have a very 
rudimentary understanding of what cognitive capabilities support or are necessary for what 
range and types of social structures.   
In the following section we draw on the limited prior attention given to this problem and 
attempt to clarify what is currently known. Throughout the discussion, pointers are provided 
to where the mechanisms being outlined have, at least in part, been incorporated into 
computer simulations of artificial intelligence or artificial societies.  
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ORDERS OF EMERGENCE 
A number of authors have identified what they refer to as orders of emergence. Gilbert, for 
example distinguishes between first and second order emergence. First order emergence 
includes macro structures which arise from local interactions between agents of limited 
cognitive range (particles, fluids, reflex action). By contrast, second order emergence is 
argued to arise „where agents recognise emergent phenomena, such as societies, clubs, formal 
organizations, institutions, localities and so on where the fact that you are a member or a 
non-member, changes the rules of interaction between you and other agents.‟ (Gilbert, 2002). 
This reflects high order cognition on the part of the agent. In particular it reflects a range of 
capabilities including but not limited to the ability to distinguish class characteristics; assess 
‘self’ for conformity with class characteristics and/or signals from other agents which suggest 
acceptance or belonging; the ability to change rule associations and behavior as a function of 
these changes. First and second order emergence then each imply qualitatively distinct 
mechanisms and suggest a continuum of orders of emergence linked, in biological entities at 
least, to cognitive capability.  
In a similar vein, Castelfranchi (1998a: 27) has distinguished what he refers to as cognitive 
emergence. „Cognitive emergence occurs where agents become aware, through a given 
„conceptualization‟ of a certain „objective‟ pre-cognitive (unknown and non deliberated) 
phenomenon that is influencing their results and outcomes, and then, indirectly, their 
actions.‟ This approach is based on a first generation AI (Franklin, 1998) approach to 
conceptualizing agents:  agent cognition is assumed to involve acting on beliefs desires and 
intentions (BDI). Thus Castelfranchi conceives of a feedback path from macro pattern to 
micro behavior in much the same way as Gilbert, except that here a cognitive mechanism is 
specified. Castelfranchi argues that this mechanism has a significant effect on emergence and 
indeed „characterises the theory of social dynamics‟ – that is, it gives rise to a distinct class of 
emergent phenomena. In this account, the representations agents have about the beliefs, 
desires and intentions of other agents plays a causal role in their subsequent behavior and 
therefore shapes the structures they participate in generating. In this same chapter 
Castelfranchi argues that understanding this process is fundamental to social simulation: it is 
where social simulation can make its greatest contribution.  
These ideas are more comprehensively reflected in the five orders of emergence suggested by 
Ellis  (2006:99-101). These are: 
1. Bottom up leading to higher level generic properties (examples include the properties 
of gases, liquids and solids) 
2. Bottom up action plus boundary conditions leading to higher level structures (e.g. 
convection cells, sand piles, cellular automata)  
3. Bottom up action leading to feedback and control at various levels leading to 
meaningful top down action - teleonomy (e.g. living cells, multi-cellular organisms 
with ‘instinctive’ – phylogenetically determined reactive capability) 
4. as per 3 but with the addition of explicit goals related to memory, influence by specific 
events in the individuals history (i.e. learning) 
5. In addition to 4 some goals are explicitly expressed in language (humans). 
Ellis’s framework makes clear that the range and type of emergence possible in a system 
depends fundamentally on the range and class of behavior agents are able to generate and that 
this varies depending on the properties of the agent. 
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If we consider Ellis’ category one emergence, it is apparent that particles have fixed 
properties and are able to enter into a limited range of interactions (specified by physical 
laws) based on those properties. Swarms of particles can nevertheless demonstrate some 
rudimentary self-organization and hence emergence (Kennedy & Eberhart, 2001). Physics has 
furnished good accounts of many specific examples (Gell-Mann, 1995) but they have limited 
implication for our understanding of social behavior.  
Category two has also recently been well explored as it is the focus of complexity theorists. 
Examples include the work of Per Bak (1996) on sand piles and earthquakes, Lorenz (2001) 
on weather systems and Prigogine (1997; 1985) on far from equilibrium systems. Many so 
called social simulations also belonging here– specifically those which incorporate agents 
which have fixed behaviors and no capacity for learning (individual or social). These include 
classic simulations based on swarms (Boids) and/or involving fixed decision criteria or rules 
such Schelling’s segregation model, the cooperation models of Axelrod (1984) or the 
Sugarscape models of Epstein and Axtell (1996). Some may argue that these models involve 
agents with goals and therefore represent examples of fourth order emergence. The transition 
between 3
rd
 order and fourth, as will be argued below, involves a move to agent autonomy 
that is missing in these models: their goals are designed in and not a result of their own 
operation it is for this reason that we argue they belong to order two.  
It is significant that Ellis provides primarily biological examples for his category three order 
of emergence. The paradigmatic biological entity which illustrates the processes of reciprocal 
micro-macro causality and for which we have an excellent description which has been made 
operational both in vitro and in silico (see for example McMullin & Grob, 2001; F. Varela, 
Maturana, & Uribe, 1974) is the cell. While the mechanisms of autocatalysis and the 
metabolic pathways of cell self-production are well known, well documented and closely 
studied, the most concise articulation of the fundamental processes involved come with the 
theory of autopoiesis developed by the theoretical biologists Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela (H. Maturana & Varela, 1980; H. R. Maturana & Varela, 1992; F. Varela, 
1979; F. Varela et al., 1974). Unfortunately this account is not widely appreciated even within 
biology itself
1
. Varela (1997: 78) states:  
Autopoiesis is a prime example of a …dialectics between the local component levels 
and the global whole, linked together in reciprocal relation through the requirement of 
constitution of an entity that self-separates from its background.  
The theory of autopoiesis provides a foundation for understanding other emergent processes, 
particularly those associated with biological entities. The originating authors themselves 
extended it to cover multi-cellular entities and to provide a more general theory of cognition. 
Others have gone so far as to argue that it furnishes a theory of society and/or organization 
(Niklas Luhmann, 1995; von_Krogh & Roos, 1995; Zeleny, 1991) although this remains 
controversial (Bednarz, 1988; Mingers, 2002, 2004) and we specifically reject it as 
incompatible with the original concept and as unnecessary (C. Goldspink, 2000; Kay, 1999).  
Unlike the self-organizing processes which characterize the second order, the defining 
characteristic of biological self-organization is the attainment of ‘strong autonomy’ (Rocha, 
1998). While Ellis does not say so directly, it would appear that it is the advent of a self-
referential operational closure which demarcates third and higher orders of emergence from 
the lower orders.  
                                                 
1
 Quite why this should be the case is not clear. It does challenge the dominant paradigm within molecular 
biology and may have been displaced by the apparent potential offered by genomics (Oyama, 2000). It may also 
be that its implications are most significant outside of the biology discipline.  
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Maturana and Varela argue that cognition is associated with this operational closure or 
autonomy. Autonomy is used here to refer to a constitutive process rather than as a 
categorical distinction and cognition is defined as the range of behaviors the agents can 
generate to remain viable or to retain its identity as a self-constituting agent (Froesea, Virgo, 
& Izquierdo, 2007; Thompson & Varela, 2001). For those immersed in symbolic AI it may 
come as a surprise that a biological cell may thus be described as a cognitive entity. This 
theme will be developed further in a following section as it is central to the idea of enactive 
cognition finding increasing uptake within second generation AI, artificial life and robotics 
(Barandiaran, 2005; Di Paolo & Lizuka, 2007; Di Paolo, Rohde, & De Jaegher, 2007; Moreno 
& Etxeberria, 1995; Moreno, Umerez, & Ibanes, 1997).  
In his third order category Ellis includes a range of capabilities of biological entities up to and 
including ‘instinctive’ action. These suggest that this category would pertain to single and 
multi-cellular organisms including those with a central nervous system. It may be that this 
order is too broadly cast. Multi-cellularity is arguably another threshold point as differentiated 
aggregates of cells display greater capacity to respond to their environment, even where they 
do not possess a central nervous system, than do individual cells. Furthermore those with a 
central nervous system enjoy even greater behavioral flexibility. As a consequence each 
probably originates a distinct macro phenomenology different from that of the cells that 
constitute them (H. R. Maturana & Varela, 1992).  
The primary point of distinction between order three and order four would appear to be 
between (phylogenetically) fixed individual characteristics and a capacity for an individual 
agent to have goals and to learn.  The mechanisms by which these characteristics are acquired 
and fixed at the level of individuals (sexual transmission and natural selection) are ignored by 
Ellis or seen as unimportant from the perspective of emergence. This is reasonable if our 
concern is with social behavior which manifests over relatively short time cycles in geological 
terms. When does a capacity to adjust structure in response to an environment as implied by 
the characteristics of Ellis’ third order become the learning ability associated with the forth 
order?  
Ellis explicitly demarcates the goal directedness of the fourth order from apparent goals 
implied in the teleonomic operation of living things implicit in the third. We must therefore 
assume he means active goal-setting : the exercise of what we commonly refer to as agency or 
free will. Agency results from the vastly expanded behavioral plasticity available when an 
organism develops an advanced nervous system.  Also, to learn an agent must have some 
form of memory. Memory too is generally associated with the existence of a central nervous 
system and is often seen as involving stored representations. But the idea of ‘representations’ 
is highly problematic from a biological point of view. What is it that is represented and how? 
We consider this problem in the next section.  
Ellis would seem to be pointing to a category here which deals with non-human animals but 
the transition points are not well defined from the perspective of mechanisms of emergence. 
Learning in animals can stretch from simple operant conditioning to complex evaluative 
processes involving logical reflexion. Different stages along this continuum would appear to 
support significantly different forms of emergent structure. Ellis makes no distinction, for 
example, between individual and social learning.  
Ellis marks his final transition from category four to category five by moving from simple 
learning capability to the capacity for language. Animals such as apes have rudimentary 
language ability – are they included in here or is this category the human catch-all category?  
Unfortunately the more closely we look at the jump between fourth and fifth order the more it 
resembles an abyss.  
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There has been a considerable research effort directed at understanding the origins and 
developmental phases associated with the attainment of the distinctive human cognitive 
capabilities. These are the capabilities which seem to relate to the transition between Ellis’ 
category four and five orders of emergence..  Much of this has drawn on comparative 
neurology, and sociological and psychological study of non-human animals, in particular 
apes. Insights are available also from developmental psychology and neurology directed at 
understanding Human ontogeny: the phases of development from infant to adult. Note that 
these may overlap as phylogenetically determined capabilities characteristic of some animals 
may correspond to early stages of human ontogenetic development. This corpus offers those 
of is involved with AI two opportunities a) a capacity to aim to better stage the development 
of agent specifications - aiming to provide a reasonable model for simple intelligence before 
the more complex and b) a capacity, even before we can effectively model or simulate more 
advanced intelligence, to theorize about the implications it may have for emergence of social 
structure.  
Some work has already been undertaken in this area, most notably in the area of robotics 
rather than computer simulation of social phenomena (although robots can be regarded as 
physical simulations and multi-agent software simulations as simulated robotics). Of 
particular note here is the work of Dautenhahn (2001; 2002), Bryson (2007; n.d) and Steels 
(1997; 2005; 1999) in the area of language.  
Gardenfors (2006) identifies the following as needing to be explained (presented in order of 
their apparent evolution). 
 Sensations 
 Attention 
 Emotions 
 Memory 
 Thought and imagination 
 Planning 
 Self-consciousness/theory of mind 
 Free-will 
 Language 
These are present to varying degrees in different organisms and develop at different stages in 
humans as they develop from infancy to adulthood.  The degree of interrelatedness is not, 
however, straight forward. Apes for example demonstrate self-awareness and theory of mind 
but do both without language whereas in humans language appears to play a significant role 
in both. For the time being then too little is known about these transitions. 
It is perhaps in understanding these transitions that we find the greatest challenges for 
advancing artificial societies and it is here that we find philosophy may have dealt us an 
unhelpful turn. The advent of the central nervous system and the observation that cognitive 
function is correlated with brain size has contributed to a distinctive account of the function of 
brain and its relationship to mind (Johnson, 1990; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In this 
convention, mind and hence cognition has been argued to originate in brains and to involve 
symbol manipulation. As we consider the literature on what makes human cognition 
distinctive, we need to be mindful of the effect of this and alternative paradigms. What are 
these alternatives and what difference do they make to our understanding of orders of 
emergence in general and social emergence in particular? 
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TWO PARADIGMS – TWO POSSIBLE APPROACHES 
Within AI there are two alternative and some argue antithetical paradigms of cognition – 
symbolic and connectionist. Symbolic AI assumes that it is possible to model every general 
intelligence using a suitable symbol system and that intelligence involves symbol 
manipulation (Franklin, 1998).  
In their The Embodied Mind, Varela & Rosch (1992) state: 
The central  intuit ion … is that  intell igence —human intell igence included—
so resembles computat ion in i ts essential  characterist ics that  cognit ion can 
actually be defined as computations of  symbolic representations  (F. Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosch,  1992: 40) .  
The symbolic approach inevitably constructs a duality. The environment is experienced as a 
facticity and acted upon directly, but is also conceived and symbolically represented in the 
mind. Mind and behaviour are linked as hypothesis and experiment. The mind looks for 
patterns in representations and tests the degree to which these accord with the outside world.  
More recently, this tradition has been challenged. The advent of complexity theory has given 
greater impetus to connectionist models of mind such as neural networks. Here emergent 
structure or pattern arises from massively interconnected webs of active agents. Applied to the 
brain, Varela et al state: 
The brain is thus a highly cooperative system: the dense interconnections 
amongst i ts components entail  that  eventually everything going on will  be a 
function of what  al l  the other components are doing (1992 : 94).   
It is important to note that no symbols are invoked or required by this model. Meaning is 
embodied in fine-grained structure and pattern throughout the network. Unlike symbolic 
systems, connectionist approaches can derive pattern and meaning by mapping a referent 
situation in many different (and context dependent) ways. Meaning in connectionist models is 
embodied by the overall state of the system in its context. It is implicit in the overall 
‘performance in some domain’. Herein lays its major problem from the perspective of multi-
agent simulation. In connectionist models the micro-states which support a given macro state 
is opaque – relatively inaccessible to an observer and difficult to interpret – indeed, there will 
often be several or many micro configurations compatible with a given macro-state 
(Richardson, 2002b).  Several attempts have been made to address this problem. The first was 
to consider hybrid systems  in an attempt to gain the advantage of each (Khosla & Dillon, 
1998). The second has been to find a middle ground. This is apparent for example in 
Gardenfors’ theory of conceptual spaces (Gardenfors, 2004). At the same time the practical 
value of connectionist systems – their capacity to categorize contexts or situations in a non-
brittle way– has been seen as a significant advantage in robotics (Brooks, 1991).  
Back in 1992 Varela et al noted that: 
…an important and pervasive shift  is  beginning to take place in cognitive 
science under the very influence of i ts own research. This shift  requires that  
we move away from the idea of the world as independent and extrinsic to the 
idea of a world as inseparable from the structure of [mental]  processes of 
self  modification. This change in stance does not express a mere 
philosophical  preference; i t  reflects the necessity of understanding cog nitive 
systems not on the basis of their  input and output relationships but  by their  
operational closure  (1992: 139).  
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They go on to argue that connectionist approaches, while an advance on cognitivism are not 
consistent with an approach which views biological agents as operationally closed in that 
„…the results of its processes are those processes themselves‟ (1992, p. 139). They assert: 
Such systems do not operate by representation. Instead of representing  an 
independent world, they enact  a world as a  domain of  dist inctions that  is 
inseparable from the s tructure embodied by the cognitive system (1992 : 
140).  
These authors argue for an approach of cognition as ‘enaction’, an intertwining of experience 
and conceptualization which results from the structural coupling of an autonomous organism 
and its environment. Autopoietic theory provided a concrete and operationalizable account of 
the intertwining of micro and macro at the level of the cell. The enactive theory of cognition 
goes some way towards providing a basis for understanding this process in multi-cellular 
animals. Enactive cognition is currently enjoying significant attention and hence conceptual 
extension as well as experimental grounding in the field of robotics (see for example De 
Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Di Paolo et al., 2007; Metta, Vernon, & Sandini, 2005). The 
attraction here is pragmatic – it helps to address longstanding problems within robotics, in 
particular the problem of symbol grounding (Harnad, 1990). To date it has seen little uptake 
within social simulation. The implications of enaction go well beyond pragmatics however.  
The enactive turn in AI has as an explicit target a resolution of the micro-macro problem.  
While symbolic AI assumes the existence of an objective independent world and a mental 
model with some correspondence to the real world, enaction dispenses with this dichotomy. 
As an autonomous entity, the cognizing agent is concerned only to maintain its viability in an 
environment. It adjusts its structure to accommodate perturbation from the environment 
(which includes other cognitive agents) in order to do so. Advanced nervous systems and 
capabilities such as language simply extend the requisite variety available to the agent 
extending the range and type of environmental perturbations it can survive.  As agents and 
environments structurally couple they co-determine one another to ‘satisfice’ the conditions 
for mutual viability. From this perspective, the importance of environment recedes from 
determinant to constraint. Intelligence moves from problem solving capacity to flexibility to 
enter into and engage with a shared world. However, McGee (2005a; 2005b) has recently 
argued that despite its promise, enactive cognition is not yet sufficiently well articulated to 
‘speak of hypothetical mechanisms’. The limiting factor here would appear to be as much one 
of insufficient application as theoretical difficulty.  In the final section we attempt a definition 
of two classes of emergence which we call reflexive and non-reflexive. These draw on the 
enactive paradigm and attempt to provide a concrete specification of the mechanisms which 
underlay each.   
TOWARDS AN ENACTIVE SPECIFICATION OF ASPECTS OF 
COGNITION AND THEIR ASSOCIATED ORDERS OF EMERGENCE 
How then do we advance our understanding of the effect f different cognitive capability on 
orders of emergence? A useful strategy may be to simplify the problem. By way of a mental 
exercise we will take simple extremes and recast the problem in terms of an enactive view. 
From an enactive position the critical phases of cognitive development appear to be as 
follows:  
 Autonomy (operational closure) 
 Structural Coupling 
 Reflexivity/self consciousness 
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 Language/consensual domains 
All living beings (from amoeba to humans) are distinguished by autonomy and as 
autonomous entities they necessarily enter into structural coupling with their environment. 
We take this as one pole of the continuum and identify the class of emergence which it can 
support as non-reflexive. This is the enactive equivalent to social order which is a product of 
emergence without the feedback loop from macro to micro which Castelfranchi (1998a) refers 
to as immergence.   The mechanisms are, however, more sophisticated than are currently 
modeled in Artificial Societies as they involve autonomous agents – these are essentially what 
Ellis refers to in his category four – i.e. biological agents which can change their structure 
(learn) in response to environmental perturbation.  It should be feasible to simulate this type 
of agent with current technology or at least to achieve a close proxy although we have not yet 
managed to do so beyond the most basic chemical system analogues of cell autopoiesis. If we 
were to achieve it how might we describe the system operation?  
Non-reflexive social emergence 
Non-reflexive emergence arises from the mechanism of structural coupling between 
operationally closed (autonomous) agents. Structural coupling will arise between such agents 
which have sufficient cognitive range (behavioral repertoire) when they are located in a 
common environment.  Assuming that their phylogeny and ontogeny is such that they can co-
exist, through the process of recurrent mutual perturbation, each will adjust its structure so as 
to accommodate the other – their structures will become mutually aligned or structurally 
coupled. This process has been approximated in a simulation by Stoica-Kluver and Kluver 
(2006).  
An observer may notice regularities in the resulting patterns of interaction and these may be 
labeled as ‘norms’ for example although Castelfranchi would refer to them as social functions 
as they ‘work without being understood’.  These patterns represent mutual accommodations, 
and an observer might attribute to those accommodations some social ‘function’. The 
accommodations an agent makes to remain viable in one domain of interaction will need to be 
reconciled (within its body-hood) against accommodations being made (simultaneously) as it 
also participates with different agents in other domain/s in which it is simultaneously 
participating – agency and structure converge and are both instantiated at the point of 
enaction. The accommodations made will be those that allow the agent to remain viable and 
to maintain its organization (i.e. which ‘satisfice’ the constraints and allow conservation of 
identity) based on its unique ontogeny (structure resulting from its history of interactions in a 
variety of domains including the current one).  
Here the emergent structure can be seen to be ‘in’ (i.e. internalized within its own cognitive 
structure) each agent to the extent that each has had to make structural adjustments to operate 
in the shared domain. The structural adjustment each needs to make in order to persist will, 
however, be unique. In other words the structural accommodations each has made in order to 
contribute to the patterns, will not be the same. The structure, then, can also be regarded as 
‘in’ the network, as it is the intersection of these disparate agent structures which gives it its 
particular form at a particular time. As any agent could leave the domain and have minimal 
effect on the resulting pattern, each agent’s ‘contribution’ will be relatively small. The pattern 
can be thought about as like a hologram. The whole is in every part (agent) such that removal 
of parts (agents) reduces the resolution (coherence) but does not constitute loss of overall 
pattern. However, the loss of too many components may reduce the coupling to the point that 
the existing pattern de-coheres and transforms into something different. Each agent 
contributes to the pattern formation, so it is conceivable that the pattern will only be realized 
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with some critical minimal number of agents present which have had a sufficient mutual 
history to have aligned their structures.   
In natural systems, the local level interactions between agents are constrained by the existing 
structures of the agents and the state of their environment.  With biological agents the system 
is open in that any emergent structure is possible as long as it remains consistent with the 
biological viability of the agents as living (autopoietic) entities. This biological constraint 
includes limits to environmental conditions conducive to life (i.e. not too hot or too cold, the 
need for energy, limitations to sensory channels, channel bandwidths and 
affective/psychomotor response capabilities etc). These are primarily a product of phylogeny 
(the evolutionary history of the organism at the level of the species) rather than ontogeny (the 
history of development at the level of the individual), and are therefore slow to change and 
not under the control of the emergent social system. As a consequence the basic 
dimensionality of the phase space of the social system does not change over the time frame of 
interest for understanding social systems.  The dimensionality of the phase space is 
determined by the dimensions of variability possible by individuals – i.e. the plasticity of their 
nervous systems and by higher order dimensions which emerge from their interaction.  
Reflexive Social Emergence 
What changes if we now jump to the opposite pole on our hypothetical continuum? Here we 
attempt to outline the difference made by agents which are self aware and which can interact 
in language.  
Biological agent’s sensory surfaces are selected to be sensitive to difference in dimension of 
their world relevant to their survival and their cognitive apparatus is thus geared to make 
distinctions relevant to maintaining their viability in past environments.  Once cognitive 
complexity exceeds a critical threshold (Gardenfors, 2006) these distinctions can be 
represented in language. Maturana and Varela (1980) describe language as involving the co-
ordination of the co-ordination of actions – i.e. language provides a meta process by which 
agents orientate themselves within a world. Structural coupling can arise purely through 
behavioral coordination of action (as discussed above), but it can also take place in and 
through linguistic exchange – the mutual co-ordination of co-ordination of behaviors.  This 
gives rise to a consensual linguistic domain characterized by a more or less shared lexicon. 
This process has been simulated using both shared referents and simple structural coupling in 
the absence of objective referents (Gong, Ke, Minett, & Wang, 2004; Hutchins & Hazlehurst, 
1995; Steels, 1997, 1998; Steels, 2005; Steels & Kaplan, 1998; Steels & Kaplan, 1999), as has 
the emergence of a rudimentary grammar (Howell & Becker, n.d; Vogt, n.d). 
The advent of language radically increases the behavioral plasticity of agents and has 
significant implications for the dimensionality of the phase space and of the resulting higher 
order structures it can generate and support.  This is because language makes possible the 
emergence of domains of interaction which can themselves become the target for further 
linguistic distinction and hence new domains.  In other words, language allows the agent to 
make distinctions on prior distinctions (to language about its prior language or to build further 
abstractions on prior abstractions). This supports the possibility of infinite recursion and 
infinite branching (there are no doubt biological constraints on this in humans). This is an 
intrinsically social process. Furthermore, a capacity to distinguish (label or categorize) 
processes supports reification and this simplifies the cognitive handling of processual 
phenomena and allows the resulting reifications to be treated by the agent in the same manner 
as material objects.  
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These capabilities greatly expand the structural flexibility of the agents: they can now invent 
shared epistemic worlds. The phase space of agent cognition is now based primarily on 
constraints of ontogeny rather than phylogeny and is hence under the influence of the agent/s.  
Language makes possible a further major qualitative difference in natural and human social 
emergence.  Humans (and possibly some other primates, cetaceans and elephants)
2
 have 
developed sufficient cognitive capacity to become self-aware and as such exhibit reflexive 
behavior.  This occurs when the agent is capable of distinguishing ‘self’ and ‘other’ i.e. the 
agent can entertain the notion of ‘I’ as a concept and treat that concept as an object. The 
advent of this capacity for reflexive identity also supposes the existence of a range of 
conceptual operators that act on identity – identity construction and maintenance becomes a 
part of the agent’s world creation. Exploration of this process is proceeding under the title of 
Neurophenomenology (Rudrauf, Lutz , Cosmelli, Lachaux , & Le Van Quyen, 2003; 
Thompson & Varela, 2001).   
In other words, agents can now notice the patterns that arise as they interact with others and 
distinguish those patterns in language. Such a mechanism would be the enactive equivalent to 
Castelfranchi’s (1998a) Cognitive Emergence.   Here a reflexive agent can notice an emergent 
pattern of social behavior and explicitly denote it as a ‘norm’ for example. While this 
denotation may be idiosyncratic (i.e. based on the necessarily limited perception of the 
individual agent), the agent can nonetheless act on the basis of this denotation.  Once 
distinguished and reified within a domain, agents can decide (on the basis of rational as well 
as value based or emotional criteria) how to respond – they can choose to ignore the norm or 
to behave in ways they believe will limit the reoccurrence of the behaviors that are outside the 
agreed/shared patterns of the group. Once a pattern has been distinguished in language it can 
make the transition to a rule: a formally stated, linguistically explicit requirement with stated 
conditionals and possible resources to maintain it. This suggests that an agent can form 
hypotheses about the relationship between a macro structural aspect of the social system in 
which it is a participant and then act on that hypothesis, potentially changing the structure 
which it participates in generating. This gives rise to a feedback path between macro and 
micro phenomena that is not present in any other natural phenomena.   
Consistent with Castelfranchi’s claim, agents possessing this cognitive complexity form the 
components of a social system which would exhibit a distinct class of emergence.  From the 
emergent perspective this is argued on the basis that reflexive agents will display qualitatively 
different behaviors from non-reflexive through the ability to modify their own sets of 
behavioral change triggers.  For agents which have linguistic capability, the two processes 
(linguistic and non-linguistic) intertwine or even become one and would not be able to be 
empirically disentangled. Their respective influences will only be able to be examined 
through simulations or by comparing agents with different (phylogenetic) capabilities (i.e. 
different species) and this sets some interesting methodological challenges. 
The Role of the Observer 
Another significant implication of the relationships described above is the observer dependant 
nature of emergence in social systems. In human social systems every agent is an observer 
and it is the process of observation and the associated distinction-making which is the 
reflexive engine of emergence. In natural systems, the agents of the system are unable to 
observe and distinguish linguistically or to distinguish external structures as separate from 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that we can infer the existence of threshold effects here but cannot precisely specify the critical points of complexity 
at which self-awareness and language becomes possible. The ability for language is of course evident in species other than humans, but the 
degree to which their linguistic plasticity involves or enables reflexivity in the system is a subject for further research. 
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themselves hence the process of observation has no impact on the dynamics of the system or 
the way in which emergence takes place.  To some extent we can see an acknowledgement of 
this effect in methodological discussions within ethnography, action research (Carr & 
Kemmis, 1986) and grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  In each of these 
methodologies the impact of the researcher on the social system under study is acknowledged 
and seen as part of the process. The view being proposed here is that any agent that becomes a 
part of the system being observed has the potential to influence that system. An agent can 
become a part of the system simply by being itself observed or conceived as observing by 
those who constitute the system. In other words, the effect of the entry of a new observing 
agent is to change the system boundary so as to include that agent. The boundary is itself an 
entity of ambiguous status – it is an epistemic distinction albeit one based on potentially 
ontological markers. In most social theory, positing the observer as a necessary part of the 
system removes any ontological privilege and threatens either infinite recursion or paradox. 
Based on the position advocated here, a degree of both may well be fundamental to the type 
of system being described (Hofstadter, 2007). 
Implications for emergence 
Complex systems of all kinds demonstrate a capacity to give rise to complex macro patterns 
as a result of local interactions between agents in highly connected webs. This local 
interaction can often be characterized as involving some signaling between agents. As we 
have seen above, in human social systems, this signaling behavior takes on a qualitatively 
different form. This has three key implications for our understanding of emergence that to 
date have largely been ignored by the literature. 
1. Social systems will display an increased range of emergent possibilities:  the reflexive 
nature of social systems implies that a greater range of emergent structures should be 
expected and they will be subject to more rapid change. 
2. Dimensions of phase space are non-constant:  As the agents in the social system define 
and redefine the phase space as a function of their reflexive distinctions they will create 
and change the dimensions of that phase space, in order to support their own viability in 
that space. 
3. Phase space comes under control of the system and is dynamic:  The dimensionality of 
the phase space associated with ontogenetic parameters is derived through the self-
distinguishing characteristics of the agents and can be influenced by their situated 
behavior. Significantly the feedback path between macro and micro would add significant 
non-linearity to the system and it becomes important to identify and explain order 
producing mechanisms within the network.  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In this chapter we have attempted to provide an operational specification of the gap implicit in 
Ellis’ fourth and fifth order emergence. In a sense we have demarcated the extremes using the 
lens of enactive cognition. Enactive cognition was selected as it provides a theoretical 
underpinning which avoids the dualism inherent in symbolic systems and the confusion of 
fundamental processes which results from this. It has been argued to be both theoretically 
better capable of capturing the essential mechanisms and of providing a practical way of 
avoiding the now well documented pitfalls of symbolic AI. From this perspective the first 
challenge that must be addressed to advance social simulation is to achieve some form or 
proxy of constitutive autonomy in our multi-agent models. Significant work is currently 
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underway on this problem in robotics but there have been few systematic attempts within 
social simulation.  
Once this has been achieved we then need to model autonomous closure in linguistic systems. 
We would seem to be a very long way from this at present. It may be possible however to 
achieve this first in some abstract domain – simulating perhaps Luhmann’s self-referential 
systems of communicative acts. This is probably unlikely however.  
In our sketching out the extremes many questions remain about what might lay in the middle. 
This middle includes very significant phases of human cognitive development – including 
theory of mind and narrative intelligence. There can be no doubt that these will support 
qualitatively distinct classes of emergent social phenomena. There is evidence from the study 
of apes that forms of these cognitive capabilities do not require language. These may be much 
more accessible to our still limited capacity to simulate than the human equivalents which 
appear to intertwine with linguistic capability. We probably have much to learn then from the 
study of primate communities and from research into cognition in species other than humans. 
At present these attract considerable less attention within the social simulation community 
and perhaps this is a mistake. We have learned a lot from ants – how much more from apes? 
Robotics also appears well equipped to incorporate the insights coming from situated, 
embodied and enactive cognition. It s more difficult to see how embodied proxies may be 
incorporated into multi-agent simulations but no doubt there are ways. Such systems will 
doubtless need to be able to bootstrap some level of operational closure and it will be 
behavior within the self-determining boundary that – free from the inevitable teleological 
hand of the designer can reveal insights into how we humans do what we seem to do so 
effortlessly – construct social worlds in which we can live viable and interesting lives.  
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